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Abstract
Empirical evidence reveals that unemployment tends to increase property
crime but that it has no effect on violent crime. To explain these facts, we
examine a model of criminal gangs and suggest that there is a substitution effect
between property crime and violent crime at work. In the model, non-monetary
valuation of gang membership is private knowledge. Thus the leaders face a
trade-off between less crime per member in large gangs and more crime per
member in small gangs. Unemployment increases the relative attractiveness of
large and less violent gangs engaging more in property crime.
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1 Introduction
Gang crime is a serious and common phenomenon. Based on survey results, the US
Department of Justice estimates that more than 24 500 gangs and 772 500 members
were active in 3300 jurisdictions across the United States in 2000 (OJJDP Fact Sheet,
2002). In Los Angeles, for example, 720 gangs consisting of 39 000 members have been
identified. These gangs are responsible for a majority of the murders in the city (Los
Angeles Times, February 6, 2007). Moreover, according to a survey of 212 US schools
made in 2006 by the “National Gang Crime Research Center”, 25 percent of American
schools reported a gang shooting near their school during the last year (Knox 2006).
In richer countries, such as the United States, Italy or France, criminal gangs are
often concentrated to relatively poor areas. Organized crime has even more severely
infected countries with widespread poverty, heavy corruption and history of violent
internal conflicts, like Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, and several other former Soviet
or Yugoslav Republics. These observations have suggested that tackling unemploy-
ment problem should automatically reduce crime, by improving the outside options of
potential perpetrators.
However, empirical evidence has not established such general connection. In an
extensive analysis of 63 studies, Chiricos (1987) finds that unemployment has a statis-
tically significant positive effect on property crime in 40 percent of the studies, while
the effect on violence is statistically significant and positive in only 22 percent of the
cases. More recently, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Agell and Nilsson (2003)
and Fougère et al. (2006) find a strong positive link between unemployment and prop-
erty crime but a small or no link between unemployment and violent crime for the
US, Sweden and France, respectively. Levitt (2004, p. 170), summarizing a number of
empirical papers, writes that “almost all of these studies report a statistically signif-
icant but substantively small relationship between unemployment rates and property
crime...Violent crime, however, does not vary systematically with the unemployment
rate.”
In this paper we offer a theory of street gangs, which can help to explain the
ambiguity between unemployment and crime.
To reflect the empirical evidence of the gang structure, we model gangs to consist
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of leaders and ordinary members. Following Padilla (1992), utility from belonging to
a gang consists of social identity, prestige, protection and respect on the streets, and
benefits from networking with the like-minded. Members differ in their valuation of
these benefits, which is their private knowledge. In return, members have to commit
violent crime, such as extortion or gang violence with the purpose to obtain drug
turfs, or property crime, like pickpocketing or auto theft. Leaders benefit from crime
committed by members. In addition, leaders reap benefits from the total number of
members in terms of prestige, and can, in line with empirical evidence (Padilla 1992
and Levitt and Venkatesh 2000), decide whom to admit as members. Because there are
adverse labor market consequences of gang membership (Hagedorn 1988 and Padilla
1992), our model assumes that gang members cannot find jobs in the legal labor market.
Members who value membership more can always mimic those with lower valuation.
As a consequence of this, leaders face a trade-off. One alternative is to select a highly-
demanding norm that results in a small group with a high level of crime per member,
either in terms of severe property crime or violent crime. The cost is that the leader
has fewer followers to give him prestige. The other alternative is to go for a less-
demanding norm where members are, for example, required to steal cars, leading to a
larger group. Our analysis reveals that a reduction in unemployment may encourage
leaders to either marginally moderate their demands, or to radically change to smaller
gangs with more severe crime. Because more unemployment reduces relatively more
the amount of crime that leaders can require from the type valuing identity less, leaders
may shift focus from property crime to violent crime at the cost of losing the members
valuing membership least. This helps to explain the empirical observations that, in
aggregate, unemployment tends to increase property crime but not violent crime.
The economic literature on organized crime was pioneered by Buchanan (1973), Ne-
her (1978), Reuter (1983), Schelling (1984) and later Fiorentini and Pelzman (1995).
Buchanan (1973) and Neher (1978) analyze the effect of the number of criminal organi-
zations. Akerlof and Yellen (1994) analyze the relationship between police enforcement
against gangs and community co-operation. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) study em-
pirically the financial activities of a drug-selling street gang. Konrad and Skaperdas
(1997) analyze how gangs’ ability to commit affects violence and Skaperdas (2001)
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studies other determinants of organized crime.
In an intriguing recent contribution, Mansour et al. (2006) model the formation of
gang structure as endogenous. They find that deterrence can have the effect of breaking
up drug cartels formed by criminal organizations, which leads to larger output and lower
prices. Like Mansour et al. (2006), we also identify a case in which a change that could
be ex ante expected to have an unambiguously positive impact, in our case reduction
in unemployment, may backfire by increasing criminality. However, in our framework
backfiring may happen without a change in the number of gangs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model and basic results are
presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we show how unemployment affects crime. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Model
A gang consists of leaders and members. Members may join a gang in order to obtain
“identity”, as is most evident in case of ethnic gangs, or to benefit from protection
that the gang provides to its members (see e.g. Padilla 1992 and Anderson 1999).
In exchange for providing membership benefits, leaders can, but need not, require
members to commit crimes. There are two types of crime: property crime and violent
crime. By violent crime, we denote more severe crime like robberies, extortion, or gang
violence with the purpose to obtain drug turfs. There is a discontinuity in the amount
of violent crime one can commit: it has to be either zero or reach a minimum level,
denoted by cv. Property crime, on the other hand, can take any non-negative values.
These assumptions are motivated by the empirical facts that violent crimes, even in
their milder forms, in most countries are punished harshly by the society. Property
crime, however, may start from modest shoplifting, which may lead to low costs if
caught, and range up to stealing cars or burglary.
Leaders derive monetary utility from crimes that members are required to commit
on their behalf, and from the total number of members. There are two types of mem-
bers, 1 and 2, differing in their valuation of gang membership. We denote variables
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referring to type j, j ∈ {1, 2} by subscript j.1 The number of potential members of
type j is nj, and the number of members of type j who stay and are not expelled is
mj, giving as total membership m = m1+m2. The number of leaders is normalized to
unity.
At the first stage, leaders declare a minimum level of crimes (ĉp, ĉv) required from
members. At the second stage, members decide how much crimes to commit. After
observing the crimes committed by individual members, leaders decide whether to keep
them or expel them.
Leaders cannot distinguish an individual member’s private valuation of member-
ship. This is a reasonable assumption, as members who value identity highly have an
incentive to lie about their type. Leaders therefore must establish a norm asking for
one level of crimes only.
Committing property crimes of level cp generates a cost λpcp. λp is a marginal
cost parameter capturing sanctions by the justice system, as well as possible social
and psychological costs. Committing violent crimes of level cv generates a cost λvcv.
λv is a marginal cost parameter capturing sanctions by the justice system, social and
psychological costs, as well as the risk of injuries and physical or psychological suffering
associated with criminal activities. Members of type j receive benefits αj from mem-
bership, so that α2 > α1. Total utility for a member of type j who chooses a level of
property (violent) crimes cpj (c
v
j ) and is not expelled is
uj = αj − λ
pcpj − λ
vcvj , (1)
while the utility of the expelled members is outside option w. Outside option w may
reflect, among other things, labor market prospects of tentative members. As mem-
bership in a gang may easily stigmatize, it is assumed that outside option is available
only for those who do not belong to a gang.2
1Our results would generalize into more than 2 discrete groups.
2While we model the outside option as uniform for all members, the results could be easily general-
ized to a case in which there are several groups of members, each with its own outside option. In that
case, leaders could price discriminate between potential members belonging to population groups with
varying levels of outside option. What drives the result is that the difference between the valuation
of gang membership and the outside option is private knowledge. If we would assume that valuation
is common knowledge, then all results would go through assuming that the outside option is private
knowledge, and there are two possible levels. Our framework could also be extended to include both
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Aggregate levels of crimes that members commit are therefore
Cp = m1c
p
1
+m2c
p
2
Cv = m1c
v
1
+m2c
v
2
.
(2)
Leaders receive utility
ul = πm+ β
pCp + βvCv. (3)
By π > 0, βp > 0, βv > 0, leaders receive a positive utility from the aggregate
level of property and violent crimes by their gang members, and from the number of
members who stay. One reason why leaders have a reason to care about the number
of members, even if members do not, is that leaders are evaluated according to how
many followers they have. We call the utility that leaders derive from the number of
followers prestige.
Leaders may expel those who commit less crimes than they require, in which case
the expelled lose membership benefits and receive payoff of outside option w. Leaders
announce a minimum level of criminality required, characterized by (ĉp, ĉv), and then
expel the members who do not fulfill it. Expulsion following defection is necessary
to maintain credibility. Crimes are committed and membership benefits are received
as a flow. For both types of members, the participation constraint is that the ex-
pected utility from membership must be higher than the outside option, implying that
requirement
αj − λ
pcpj − λ
vcvj ≥ w,
needs to be satisfied for type j to stay. Notice that whether violent crime is profitable
for leaders depends on how the difference between the returns to different types of
crime to leaders relates to the difference between the costs of different types of crime
to members. Without loss of generality, we assume that if indifferent between violent
crime and property crime, leaders choose property crime. We find:
Lemma 1 Requiring a positive level of violent crime can be profitable only if
βv >
λv
λp
βp (4)
being private knowledge, in which case there would be several discrete groups.
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and
α2 ≥ w + λ
vcv.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 provides a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a gang leader to
require violent crime. The condition is not sufficient as it does not compare yet payoffs
from alternative strategies. For example, requiring only property crime may be optimal
to keep members with lower valuation on board. We next establish that leaders do at
least as well by focusing on only one type of crime than by asking a positive level of
both property and gang crime:
Lemma 2 Focusing on only property or violent crime gives at least as high a utility
than requiring a strictly positive level of both.
Proof. See Appendix.
Leaders face two alternative strategies. One is to choose such level of crimes that
both types stay, and another to choose such a level that only type 2 stays. When
pursuing either strategy, leaders have to decide whether to ask for property crime or
violent crime. Note that as there is a minimum value of violent crime that is feasible,
it may be that the strategy of requiring violent crime is not feasible. The condition
that has to be satisfied for requiring violent crime from type 1 is
Condition 1. Leaders can require violent crime from type-1 members if and only if
w ≤ α1 − λ
vcv.
Correspondingly, it holds for type 2 that
Condition 2. Leaders can require violent crime from type-2 members if and only if
w ≤ α2 − λ
vcv.
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Provided Condition 1 is satisfied, leaders can choose a strategy of requiring a level
of violence with which type-1 members are indifferent between staying and leaving.
This is given by
ĉv
1
=
α1 − w
λv
. (5)
Provided that Condition 2 is satisfied, leaders can choose a strategy of requiring
a level of violence with which type-2 members are indifferent between staying and
leaving. This is given by
ĉv
2
=
α2 − w
λv
. (6)
Note that as α2 > α1, Condition 2 implies that Condition 1 is also satisfied. The
reverse need not hold. The other two strategies are choosing a requirement of property
crime so that either both types or only type-2 stays. If leaders want to ensure both
types to stay with property crime, they choose
ĉp
1
=
α1 − w
λp
(7)
for the (n1 + n2) members that stay. If leaders are willing to sacrifice type 1 members
to extract more property crime from type 2, they choose
ĉp
2
=
α2 − w
λp
, (8)
for the n2 staying members.
We can now solve for the optimal strategies by leaders:
Proposition 1 (i) If (4) or Condition 2 is not satisfied, leaders choose ĉp
1
if
n1π ≥ β
p(n2ĉ
p
2
− (n1 + n2)ĉ
p
1
) (9)
and ĉp
2
otherwise. (ii) If (4) and Condition 1 are satisfied, leaders choose ĉv
1
if
n1π ≥ β
v(n1ĉ
v
2
− (n1 + n2)ĉ
v
1
) (10)
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and ĉv
2
otherwise. (iii) If (4) and Condition 2 are satisfied but Condition 1 is not
satisfied, leaders choose ĉp
1
if
n1π ≥ β
vn2ĉ
v
2
− βp(n1 + n2)ĉ
p
1
(11)
and ĉv
2
otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that in each regime that is listed in Proposition 1, leaders face a choice between
a smaller gang with more crime per member, and a large and less demanding gang.
The proposition has several implications:
First of all, prestige that leaders derive from the number of members may, but need
not, encourage leaders to reduce their requirement of crime.3 For example, because of
prestige considerations, leaders may opt for a larger gang that pursues property crime,
instead of a small one specializing in violent crime, as evident from case (iii).
Second, toughening the punishment for violent crime or reducing the punishment for
property crime may encourage gang leaders initially pursuing violent crime to switch
to property crime. To see this, notice that leaders may find it optimal to pursue
violent crime only if (4) is satisfied, and that λp (λv) includes marginal cost of property
(violent) crime for members.
Also, changing the payoffs of different types of crime to leaders has corresponding
effects. For example, reducing profits that leaders derive from property crime (that is,
reducing βp) may result in a backlash in violence if leaders change strategies to smaller
and more violent gangs.
3 Unemployment and Crime
Taking into account that unemployment is usually only temporary and that a career as
a member of criminal gang may exclude employment in the legal market, it is natural
to interpret the outside option w to reflect the expected income available from the
3Note that leaders may choose a larger gang even if they would not derive utility from prestige.
To see this, notice that if n2/n1 would approach to zero, the right-hand sides of (9), (10) and (11)
would each be negative. Then, a larger group would be optimal even without prestige.
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legal labor market. With a given level of wages, a reduced unemployment improves the
outside option w that the members face. One could expect this to be unequivocally
beneficial when targeting crime. However, notice that when the valuation of gang
membership is private knowledge, leaders suffer from mimicking constraint if they
want to keep also members of type 1. As members of type 2 can claim to be of type
1, keeping type 1 members restricts the level of crime that can be extracted from type
2, also. Increasing the outside option w reduces relatively more crime that can be
required from type 1 members, rendering keeping them relatively more expensive in
terms of forgone crime. This intuition can be summarized as two propositions:
Proposition 2 If membership does not change, a decrease in unemployment results
in a marginal reduction in crime, whether the gang specializes in violent or property
crime.
Proof. By Proposition 1, leaders choose (5), (6), (7) or (8). The claim follows as
each of these is decreasing in w, corresponding to a decrease in unemployment.
Proposition 3 An decrease in unemployment may trigger a change from a larger gang
with less crime to a smaller gang with more crime, including a possible shift from a
gang specializing in property crime to a smaller gang specializing in violent crime.
Proof. When the right-hand side of (9), (10) or (11) is negative, it is never optimal
to choose such a strategy that leads to a smaller gang. When the right-hand side
is positive, whether leaders go for a smaller gang with more low-intensity crime or
a larger gang with more high-intensity crime depends on their relative valuation of
different types of crime and prestige from membership. As the right-hand sides are
then decreasing in w, a decrease in unemployment may trigger a switch to the smaller
gang with more crime.
Propositions 2 and 3 have empirically testable implications. Proposition 2 implies
that if reduced unemployment is not associated with a change in the size of gangs, then
total amount of crime that leaders receive should decrease. Proposition 3 implies that
if a small reduction in unemployment would lead into a change in gang membership,
this would be a switch to a more hard-line gang, either with a discrete increase in the
level of property or violent crime, or a switch from property to violent crime.
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Together, Propositions 2 and 3 provide an economic interpretation for why empirical
studies find that while unemployment tends to increase property crime, the effect on
violent crime is not clear. If gangs become smaller when unemployment is reduced,
then they may also become more violent. In this case, leaders replace property crime
by violent crime. However, if the size of gangs does not change, then both property
and violent crime are reduced when unemployment goes down.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper suggests an explanation to the empirical regularity whereby unemployment
tends to increase property crime, but not violent crime. We focus on gangs and suggest
that there is a substitution effect between property crime and violent crime at work.
Gang members differ in their valuation of gang membership and this is their private
knowledge, while the outside option of gang members reflects observable labor market
situation, and is negatively linked to unemployment. Members with high valuation can
always mimic those with lower valuation. Thus, gang leaders have to choose a common
norm of crime to all members who are identical in their observable characteristics,
including the outside option. A reduction in unemployment makes the mimicking
effect more severe. The reason is that reduced unemployment improves the outside
option for both the members with low valuation of gang membership and those with
high valuation. The improved outside option reduces the willingness to pay for gang
membership for both types, the reduction being relatively larger for members with
a lower valuation. As a result, it may be optimal for leaders to forgo membership
benefits from those with low valuation of membership, and establish a higher level
of requirement that only those with high valuation are willing to satisfy. Hence, a
reduction in unemployment may cause a move towards smaller and more violent gangs,
thus increasing violent crime.
Our results should not be interpreted as an advice not to reduce unemployment, in
fear of this boosting gang violence. Instead, they highlight the need to properly study
violent gangs, in order to anticipate whether such problems are likely to arise. Social
policies that reduce unemployment may backfire by resulting in smaller and more crim-
inal gangs. As a result, policing and social policies may, under certain circumstances,
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be complements rather than substitutes. In order to cancel the backfiring effect, re-
duced unemployment may actually call for more rather than less policing in previously
troubled neighborhoods.
Our finding is connected to the insight by Mansour et al. (2006) who find that a
tougher crime deterrence may increase the number of gangs. In their model, policing
targets more efficiently large gangs. The potential for backfiring results when tougher
policing causes large cartels to break into smaller gangs that cannot coordinate to
restricting the amount of drugs sold to the level that would maximize the profits of
a monopoly cartel. However, we find that the backfiring effect need not require that
the number of gangs changes, or that the gangs would coordinate on the amount of
criminal activity.
Our results also imply a need for an integrated judicial policy: too tough penal-
ties for property crime may backfire by resulting in more violent crime. Similarly,
reducing the prestige that leaders derive from membership may backfire by hardening
their stance. In addition to gang crime, such a mechanism may help to explain the
radicalization of ideological, ethnic or religious groups under certain circumstances.
We presented our analysis using a simple model in which the marginal benefit of
the two types of crime to leaders is constant. The analysis could be straightforwardly
generalized to allow for several types of crimes, each with its own payoffs and costs.
By varying the costs of different crimes, society can choose which crimes it suffers.
Furthermore, changes in unemployment and other forms of outside option affect the
trade-offs available.
References
[1] Agell Jonas and Nilsson Anna (2003), “Crime, Unemployment and Labor Mar-
ket Programs in Turbulent Times”, forthcoming in the Journal of the European
Economic Association.
[2] Akerlof Georg A. and Kranton Rachel E. (2000), “Economics and Identity”, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 115: 715-753.
[3] Anderson Elijaha (1999), Code of the Street (Norton, New York).
12
[4] Buchanan James M. (1973), “A Defence of Organized Crime”, in The Economics
of Crime and Punishment, Rottemberg S (ed.) (Washington, D.C., The American
Enterprise Institute, 1973).
[5] Chiricos Theodor (1987), “Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis of
Aggregate Research Evidence”, Social Problems, 34:187-211.
[6] Hagedorn John (1988), People and Folks: Gangs, Crime and the Underclass in a
Rustbelt City (Chicago: Lake View Press).
[7] Fiorentini Gianluca and Peltzman Sam (1995), The Economics of Organized
Crime, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[8] Fougère Denis, Francis Kramarz and Julien Pouget (2006), “Youth Unemployment
and Crime in France”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2009.
[9] Konrad Kai and Skaperdas Stergios (1997), “Credible Threats in Extortion”, Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 33: 23-39.
[10] Knox GeorgeW. (2006), “Findings from the K-12 Survey Project, a Special Report
of the NGCRC”, Mimeo, The National Gang Crime Research Center.
[11] Levitt Steven D. and Venkatesh Sudhir (2000), “An Economic Analysis of a Drug-
Selling Gang’s Finances”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 755-789.
[12] Levitt Steven D. (2004), “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Fac-
tors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not”, Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 18: 163-190.
[13] Los Angeles Times (February 6, 2007) “Los Angeles Names and Targets City’s
Worst 11 Gangs”
[14] Mansour Abdala, Marceau Nicolas and Mongrain Steeve (2006), “Gangs and
Crime Deterrence”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 22: 315-339.
[15] Neher Philip A. (1978), “The Pure Theory of the Muggery”, American Economic
Review, 68: 437-45.
13
[16] OJJDP Fact Sheet (2002), “Highlights of the 2000 National Youth Gang Survey”,
Mimeo, US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention,
[17] Padilla Felix M. (1992), The Gang as an American Enterprise (Rutgers University
Press, New Jersey).
[18] Raphael Steven and Winter-Ebmer Rudolf (2001), “Identifying the Effect of Un-
employment on Crime”, Journal of Law & Economics, 44: 259-284.
[19] Reuter Dennis (1983), Disorganized Crime, Illegal Markets and the Mafia (MIT
Press, Cambridge)
[20] Schelling Thomas (1984), “What is the Business of Organized Crime?” in Choice
and Consequence, (Harvard university press, Cambridge).
[21] Skaperdas Stergios (2001), “The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing
Protection when the State Does Not”, Economics of Governance, 2: 173-202.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. (1) Let us first analyze an arbitrary positive level c˜v of violent
crime, in case cv = 0. The utility cost is for a gang member λv c˜v. A corresponding
utility cost would arise from increasing the amount of property crime by c˜vλv/λp. The
utility that the gang leader would receive from violent crime c˜v is βv c˜v. The utility
from replacing this by property crime would be βpc˜vλv/λp. The utility from property
crime exceeds that from violent crime if βv < λ
v
λp
βp, and they are equal if βv = λ
v
λp
βp.
Remembering the assumption that in case of indifference gang leader requires property
crime, a necessary condition for it being profitable to require any positive amount of
violent crime is that βv > λ
v
λp
βp. 2) When cv > 0, one has also to take into account
the participation constraint of potential members. A necessary condition for it being
optimal to require violent crime is that at least members who value membership most
(i.e., members of type 2) are willing to stay at least if no property crime is required in
addition to cv, giving as condition α2 − λ
vcv ≥ w.
Proof of Lemma 2. Make a counterassumption that the gang leaders would
require a strictly positive level of both types of crime. A necessary condition for this
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is that α2 ≥ w + λ
vcv. Otherwise, requiring a positive level of violent crime cannot be
optimal as there would be no members. Assume next that this holds. If βv < λ
v
λp
βp,
then requiring a positive level of violent crime cannot be optimal by Lemma 1. On the
other hand, if βv > λ
v
λp
βp then it would be optimal to stop requiring property crime and
increase the requirement of violent crime so that the total burden on members does not
change. This leaves the case in which βv = λ
v
λp
βp. In this case, leaders would receive
the same utility by dropping the requirement of violent crime and replacing this by
increasing the requirement by property crime so that the utility of members does not
change. This completes the proof that leaders never strictly prefer requiring a positive
level of both types of crime.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that it is never optimal for leaders
to choose any other level of crime than those specified in equations (5) to (8). If
leaders would choose a level above either (6) and (8), no members would stay and thus
reducing the level of crime to either of these levels would improve leaders’ utility. If
leaders would require a level of violence (property crime) below (6) ((8)) but above (5)
((7)), then leaders could increase the requirement to the level (6) ((8)) without causing
any members to leave. Correspondingly, if leaders would require a level of violence
(property crime) below (5) ((7)), then leaders could increase the requirement to this
level without causing any members to leave. (i) If (4) is not satisfied, it is not profitable
for leaders to require violence. If Condition 2 is not satisfied, leaders cannot require
violence as they would then lose all members. In either case, the choice between leaders
is for utility in case of choosing (7) or (8). (ii) By (4) and Condition 1, leaders prefer
to require violence and can choose as the level of violence (5) or (6). The maximization
problems simplifies to choosing between these two. (iii) By (4) and Condition 2 but
not Condition 1 being satisfied, leaders prefer to require violence if only members of
type 2 stay, while they have to restrict to requiring property crime if also members of
type 1 stay.
15
